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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

:
:

v.

:

LUIS A. GUZMAN,

:

Case No. 20040647-SC

:

Petitioner is incarcerated.

Defendant/Petitioner.

INTRODUCTION
This Court should reverse the court of appeals' decision in State v. Guzman, 2004
UT App 211, 95 P.3d 302, because it erroneously holds the admission of testimony
concerning an eyewitness5 subjective certainty of identification does not violate the due
process clause of the Utah Constitution or rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY HELD THE ADMISSION OF
EYEWITNESS CERTAINTY EVIDENCE DOES NOT VIOLATE
THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION

First, the State argues this Court should affirm the court of appeals' decision
because this Court's case law has not required juries to consider certainty testimony "as a
matter of law," but has "allowed juries to consider" it. Rspt. Br. at 11, 18. Contrary to
the State's argument, this Court has not yet decided whether certainty testimony is
admissible. See Order dated November 10, 2004. This Court has, however, recognized

the danger of certainty testimony and deliberately excluded it from the list of factors a
jury should consider when deciding the credibility of an eyewitness identification. See
State v.Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 781 (Utah 1991); State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 490
(Utah 1986). Because an eyewitness9 certainty may or may not indicate accuracy and
there is no way to decide whether a particular witness5 certainty indicates accuracy or
inaccuracy in a particular case, this Court rejected eyewitness certainty "as an indicator of
an identification's reliability." Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781; see Long, 721 P.2d at 490.
Instead, this Court held the jury should decide credibility by considering factors that can
actually be weighed by the jury, such as:
(1) The opportunity of the witness to view the actor during
the event; (2) the witness's degree of attention to the actor at
the time of the event; (3) the witness's capacity to observe the
event, including his or her physical and mental acuity; (4)
whether the witness's identification was made spontaneously
and remained consistent thereafter, or whether it was the
product of suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event being
observed and the likelihood that the witness would perceive,
remember and relate it correctly. This last area includes such
factors as whether the event was an ordinary one in the mind
of the observer during the lime it was observed, and whether
the race of the actor was the same as the observer's.
Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 781; Long. 721 P.2d at 490.
By so holding, this Court purposefully diverged from federal case law and the
jurisdictions that follow federal case law. Long, 721 P.2d at 491 (criticizing courts and
attorneys for "comfortably rely[ing] upon settled legal precedent," and "largely ignoring]
the teachings of other disciplines, especially when they contradict long-accepted legal
2

notions"): see Neil v. Biggers. 409 U.S. 188,198-99 (1972) (listing, unlike Utah, witness
certainty as factor "to be considered in evaluating the likelihood of misidentification");
Jones v. State. 539 S.E.2d 143, 146-47 (Ga. 2000) (unlike Utah, following BiggersJ use
of certainty as factor for determining reliability of identification); State v. McClendon,
730 A.2d 1107, 1115-16 (Conn. 1999) (unlike Utah, concluding problems with
eyewitness identifications are "general principles [that] should come as no surprise to the
average juror"); State v. Williamson. 539 A.2d 561, 565 (Conn. 1988) (same as Jones):
but see Rspt. Br. at 27-28 (urging this Court to follow Jones and McClendon).
Although this Court has not specifically decided whether certainty testimony is
admissible, its decisions in Ramirez and Long indicate that admitting certainty testimony
would violate due process. See Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781; Long. 721 P.2d at 490. If, as
this Court has already held, eyewitness certainty is too unreliable to be a factor for
determining eyewitness credibility, then it should not be admitted into evidence at all
because its very presence taints the jury's decision. See Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 778
(holding courts must not "leave protection of constitutional rights to the whim of a jury").
A "confident witness tends to make participant-jurors ignore the witnessing conditions
themselves and believe the eyewitness at a rate that exceeds the actual rate of accuracy."
D. P. Judges, Two Cheers for the Department of Justice's Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide
for Law Enforcement, 53 Ark. L. Rev. 231, 264 (2000) [hereinafter Judges] (citing G. L.
Wells & A. L. Bradfield, "Good, You Identified the Suspect": Feedback to Eyewitnesses

3

Distorts Their Reports of the Witnessing Experience, 83 J. Applied Psychol. 360, 361
(1998) [hereinafter Wells & Bradfield]); see R. N. Haber & L. Haber, Experiencing,
Remembering and Reporting Events, 6 Psychol. Pub. Pol. & L. 1057,1059 (2000)
[hereinafter Haber & Haber] ("Jurors report that they find it very difficult to consider any
alternatives to a confident statement by an eyewitness."); G. L. Wells & E. P. Seelau,
Eyewitness Identification: Psychological Research and Legal Policy on Lineups, 1
Psychol. Pub. Pol. & L. 765, 773 (1995) [hereinafter Wells & Seelau] (noting witness
confidence "is the single most powerful determinant of whether testimony observers
believe that the eyewitness made an accurate identification" (citations omitted)); J.
Brigham, A. Wasserman & C. Meissner, Disputed Eyewitness Identification Evidence:
Important Legal and Scientific Issues, 36 Ct. Rev. 1, 12 (1999) [hereinafter Brigham,
Wasserman & Meissner] ("Eyewitness testimony, when delivered in a confident manner
by a witness, may be more convincing to jurors than any other type of evidence.").
Instead, this Court should require the State to extract the details and circumstances
surrounding the identification that are necessary to prove the identification is credible
beyond a reasonable doubt, not just credible in the eyewitness5 mind. See State v.
Hubbard, 2002 UT 45,^25, 48 P.3d 953 (holding eyewitness testimony must be reliable
under "totality of the circumstances"); State v. Hollen, 2002 UT 35,lffl29-64, 44 P.3d 794
(conducting detailed analysis of identifications based on Ramirez factors); State v.
Decorso, 1999 UT 57,fflj42-47, 993 P.2d 837 (same), cert, denied, 528 U.S. 1164 (2000);
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State v.Jonas, 725 P.2d 1378,1381 (Utah 1986) (same).
As explained in Guzman's opening brief, the fact that this Court mentioned
eyewitness certainty when analyzing Long's spontaneity and consistency factor in State
v. Hoffhine. 2001 UT 4, 20 P.3d 265, and Hubbard, does not mean this Court has
retreated from its strong condemnation of certainty testimony. See. Pet. Br. at 23-24.
Neither Hoffhine nor Hubbard addressed whether certainty testimony is a factor for
determining credibility or is admissible. See Hubbard. 2002 UT 45 at ^[1 (deciding
whether trial court erred by admitting eyewitness identifications and excluding expert on
eyewitness identification); Hoffhine, 2001 UT 4 at ^J16 (deciding whether trial court
erred by suppressing eyewitness identification but "admitting the underlying facts" of the
showup identification). Moreover, in Hoffhine, this Court actually restated and affirmed
its holding that it "has specifically rejected the 'level of certainty demonstrated by the
witness at the confrontation' as a factor to be used in determining the constitutional
reliability of an identification." IcL at TJ16 (citing Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781; Long, 721
P.3d at 490). As explained by Ramirez, the "relevant circumstances" for weighing
spontaneity and consistency, rather than including certainty testimony, include
circumstances that can actually be weighed by the jury, such as:
the length of time that passed between the witness's
observation at the time of the event and the identification of
defendant; the witness's mental capacity and state of mind at
the time of the identification; the witness's exposure to
opinions, descriptions, identifications, or other information
from other sources; instances when the witness or other
5

eyewitnesses to the event failed to identify defendant;
instances when the witness or other eyewitnesses gave a
description of the actor that is inconsistent with defendant;
and the circumstances under which defendant was presented
to the witness for identification.
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783.
Second, the State claims the admission of certainty testimony does not violate
Utah's due process clause because some scientific articles claim a relationship exists
between confidence and accuracy, science may have miscalculated this relationship, and
this relationship might increase where good observation conditions exist. Rspt. Br. at 1826 (citations omitted). The State concedes, however, that certainty testimony has
"problems" and that the correlation between confidence and accuracy, even considering
the scientific articles it cites, is "'weak' to 'modest'" or "'medium'" at best. Rspt. Br. at
21, 24 (quoting S. Penrod & B. Cutler, Witness Confidence and Witness Accuracy:
Assessing Their Forensic Relation. 1 Psychol. Pub. Pol. & L. 817, 842 (1995)
[hereinafter Penrod & Cutler]; K. Bothwell, A. Deffenbacher & J. C. Brigham,
Correlation of Eyewitness Accuracy and Confidence: Optimality Hypothesis Revisited,
72 J. Applied Psychol. 4, 693 (1987)).
Thus, the articles cited by the State do not change the fact that scientific research
has "undermined the common notion that the confidence with which an individual makes
an identification is a valid indicator of the accuracy of the recollection." Long, 721 P.2d
at 490 (citations omitted); see also E. S. Higgins & B. S. Skinner, Establishing the

6

Relevance of Expert Testimony Regarding Eyewitness Identification: Comparing Forty
Recent Cases with the Psychological Studies. 30 N. Ky. L. Rev. 471,483 (2003) ("The
confidence exhibited by the eyewitness at the initial identification has been shown to be
only mildly associated with accuracy." (citation omitted)); Penrod & Cutler, 1 Psychol.
Pub. Pol. & L. at 830 (explaining confidence is "weak indicator of eyewitness accuracy
even when measured at the time an identification is made and under relatively 'pristine'
laboratory conditions"); M. Kebbell & D. Giles, Some Experimental Influences of
Lawyers' Complicated Questions on Eyewitness Confidence and Accuracy. 134 J.
Psychol. 129, 136 (March 2000) (testing confidence under "confusing conditions" and
finding witnesses "were highly confident and wrong").
As claimed by the State, witness confidence may, at times, indicate identification
accuracy. Rspt. Br. at 18-23. But the fact remains that identification accuracy is also "at
times, inversely related to the confidence with which it is made" and there is no way for a
jury to decide whether a particular witness' certainty indicates accuracy or inaccuracy in
a particular case. Long, 721 P.2d at 490 (citation omitted). Thus, permitting a jury to
consider an eyewitness' certainty testimony when deciding the credibility of the
eyewitness' identification is equivalent to permitting the jury to decide credibility based
on intuition rather than evidence and, in many cases, that intuition is wrong. See Judges,
53 Ark. L. Rev. at 264 ("Most people—including police, prosecutors, jurors, trial judges,
and appellate judges—rely heavily on witness confidence as a guide to witness accuracy."

7

(citation omitted)); Brigham, Wasserman & Meissner, 36 Ct. Rev. at 25 (noting "intuitive
beliefs usually serve us well in dealing with the world," but in the area of eyewitness
memory, "these usually reliable beliefs are not accurate enough to ensure fair treatment
under the law" (emphasis in original)).
Third, the State argues that despite its "problems," certainty testimony is
admissible because some scientific articles say a cautionary instruction or expert
testimony is sufficient to cure the taint of certainty testimony. Rspt. Br. at 24-25 (citing
S. L. Sporer, S. D. Penrod, J. D. Read, & B. L. Cutler, Choosing, Confidence, and
Accuracy: A Meta-Analysis of the Confidence-Accuracy Relation in Eyewitness
Identification Studies, 118 Psychol. Bull. 3, 315, 324 (1995) [hereinafter Sporer, Penrod,
Read & Cutler]; J. L. Devenport, et al., Eyewitness Identification Evidence: Evaluating
Commonsense Evaluations, 3 Psychol. Pub. Pol. & L. 338, 358 (1997) [hereinafter
Devenport]; Brigham, Wasserman & Meissner, 36 Ct. Rev. at 25; M. R. Leippe, The
Case for Expert Testimony About Eyewitness Memory, 1 Psychol., Pub. Pol. & L. 909,
948 n.5 (1995) [hereinafter Leippe]). Neither a cautionary instruction nor expert
testimony, however, can adequately cure the taint of certainty testimony. As explained in
Guzman's opening brief, scientific research shows cautionary instructions and expert
testimony are powerless against the overwhelming impact of certainty testimony. Pet. Br.
at 19-20; see Judges, 53 Ark. L. Rev. at 234 (suggesting normal corrective mechanisms
"are less than adequate to remedy the problem" of certainty testimony); Leippe, 1
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Psychol. Pub. Pol. & L. at 939 (summarizing Cutler, Penrod, and Dexter study that found
expert testimony does not consistently eliminate effects of eyewitness confidence); S. G.
Fox & H. A. Walters, The Impact of General Versus Specific Expert Testimony and
Eyewitness Confidence Upon Mock Juror Judgment, 10 Law and Hum. Behav. 3, 215-28
(1986) (finding jurors in expert testimony conditions "continued to use eyewitness
confidence as a guide to assessing eyewitness accuracy" and, in fact, gave more weight to
witness confidence than jurors in no-expert conditions).
In fact, even the articles cited by the State suggest jury instructions and expert
testimony are not sufficient to cure the taint of certainty testimony. See Rspt. Br. at 2425; Brigham, Wasserman & Meissner, 36 Ct. Rev. at 21-23 (noting "existing cautionary
judicial instructions" are inadequate, noting purpose of expert is to provide "factually
based frame of reference within which to interpret the eyewitness evidence," and listing
reasons for which eyewitness expert testimony is often deemed inadmissible); Devenport,
3 Psychol. Pub. Pol. & L. at 356 (noting expert testimony increased juror sensitivity to
"trivial relation between eyewitness confidence and identification accuracy" from 36% to
just 58%); Leippe, 1 Psychol. Pub. Pol. & L. at 923, 937, 939 (explaining "instructions
cannot be relied on to counter mistaken eyewitness identification"; studies show "beliefenhancing effect of confidence persisted despite expert testimony"; and jurors "may not
be able retrospectively to apply new knowledge about the nondiagnosticity of and
behavioral correlates of confidence"); Sporer, Penrod, Read & Cutler, 118 Psychol. Bull.
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at 324 (noting "there are conflicting findings on the question of whether expert testimony
increases sensitivity to variations in witness confidence," and in fact, "an expert may only
compound juror reliance on confidence").
Besides, cautionary instructions and expert testimony on certainty testimony are
rarely allowed. See, e.g.. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45 at ^20 (upholding decision to exclude
expert testimony on eyewitness identification, including certainty testimony, because it
"'would, in fact, merely lecture the jury.5" and "would 'have a significant tendency to
cause the jury to abdicate its role as fact finder'"); Long, 721 P.2d at 496 (Hall, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (noting Long instruction, even without certainty instruction,
is inappropriate comment on the evidence); Long, 721 P.2d at 497 (Howe, J., concurring
and dissenting) (noting Long instruction, even without certainty instruction, is
inappropriate because "sheer length and detail... overshadows the other instructions and
is heavily slanted in favor of the defendant"). In fact, the State itself concedes the
certainty jury instruction contemplated in this case probably would not have been
allowable because, according to the State, it was an "improper comment by the court on
the evidence." Rspt. Br. at 27 n.10 (citing Utah R. Crim. P. 19); cfL J.W. v. State, 2001
UT App 208,^15 n. 4, 30 P.3d 1232 (holding argument preserved because parties argued
evidence during closing and "any further objections or motions regarding this issue
would have been futile").
Accordingly, a greater protection against the overwhelming taint of certainty

10

evidence, such as exclusion, is needed. Pet. Br. at 20-21; see. Haber & Haber, 6 Psychol.
Pub. Pol. & L. at 1084 ("The negligible correlation between accuracy and confidence at
the time of identification, and the several factors that can subsequently increase
confidence that have no relation at all to accuracy, all suggest that this part of testimony
should be excluded."). Excluding certainty testimony would remove nondiagnosable but
highly influential testimony from the jury, and allow the jury to decide the case based on
circumstances that can be adequately weighed and compared against the evidence. See
Judges, 53 Ark. L. Rev. at 264; Wells & Bradfield, 83 J. Applied Psychol, at 361; Haber
& Haber, 6 Psychol. Pub. Pol. & L. at 1059; Wells & Seelau, 1 Psychol. Pub. Pol. & L. at
773; Brigham, Wasserman & Meissner, 36 Ct. Rev. at 12.
Fourth, contrary to the State's argument, Guzman was prejudiced by the
admission of Miller's certainty testimony. Rspt. Br. at 24-26, 32. As argued by the
State, a few circumstances surrounding the identification may have increased the
credibility of Miller's identification. Id. As explained in Guzman's opening brief,
however, there were also numerous circumstances that decreased the credibility of her
identification. Pet. Br. at 25-27. These circumstances included suggestive identification
procedures and weakened perceptual abilities due to the short, violent nature of the
encounter during which Miller was confronted by multiple strangers in her own garage,
threatened with a loaded gun, bound, forced to lie face-down on the garage floor, and left
so frightened that she vomited after the encounter ended. Id_; R. 253:124-67. The
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admission of Miller's strong certainty testimony was harmful because it likely blinded the
jury to all of these circumstances, good and bad alike, and caused the jury to find Miller's
identification credible based on her own assertion of confidence rather than on the
evidence. Pet. Br. at 25; see Penrod & Cutler, 1 Psychol. Pub. Pol. & L. at 821-22
(noting studies have shown jurors ignore circumstances surrounding an identification
when witness professes high degree of certainty). Moreover, as explained in Guzman's
opening brief, Fernandez's credibility was severely hampered by his testimony that he
had lied about the case before in hopes of leniency and that he was still waiting to be
sentenced in the case and was hoping to receive probation. Pet. Br. at 24; R. 254:249-61.
II.

THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY HELD THE ADMISSION OF
EYEWITNESS CERTAINTY EVIDENCE DOES NOT VIOLATE
RULE 403 OF THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE

First, the State argues this Court should "vacate the court of appeals' treatment of
rule 403, and refuse to consider [Guzman's] rule 403 claim" because Guzman did not
properly preserve his rule 403 argument. Rspt. Br. at 31. Rule 49 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure says f![o]nly the questions set forth in the petition or fairly included
therein will be considered by the Supreme Court." Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4). This Court
granted a writ of certiorari in this case to decide two issues: (1) "Whether the admission
of testimony concerning an eyewitness' subjective certainty of identification violates the
due process clause of the Utah Constitution," and (2) "Whether testimony concerning an
eyewitness' subjective certainty of identification is inadmissible under rule 403." Order
12

dated November 10,2004. These issues are limited and do not include the separate issue
of whether Guzman preserved his argument that certainty evidence is inadmissible under
rule 403. IcL Thus, this Court should only address the issues on certiorari review and
should not address the separate issue of preservation. I&_
This decision is appropriate because preservation was adequately addressed
below. In the court of appeals, Guzman argued that admitting the certainty testimony
violated rule 403 because "the prejudicial effect of allowing the jury to hear the certainty
testimony substantially outweigh[ed] its probative value." Guzman, 2004 UT App 211 at
1Hfl2, 32. In response, the State argued the court of appeals should not consider
Guzman's rule 403 claim because he did not preserve the issue below or argue plain error
on appeal. Addendum A. In its decision, the court of appeals did not individually
address the State's preservation claim, but chose instead to reject the State's claim by
reaching the merits of Guzman's rule 403 argument. Guzman, 2004 UT App 211 at
11132-33; see State v. Arguelles. 921 P.2d 439, 445 (Utah 1996) (declining to reach
merits of defendant's claim because he did not preserve issue for appeal); State v. Irwin,
924 P.2d 5, 12 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (same), cert, denied, 931 P.2d 146 (Utah 1997).
If the State disagreed with the court of appeals' decision to reject its preservation
argument and reach the merits of Guzman's rule 403 issue, then it should have filed a
cross-petition asking this Court to review this issue. Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4). The
State, however, did not file a cross-petition and, consequently, this Court did not include
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preservation in the issues on certiorari review. See. Order dated November 10, 2004.
There are also strong policy reasons for declining to address the State's
preservation claim in this case. This Court does not grant certiorari to create a second
direct appeal, but to decide the narrow issues that it itself defines. See, e.g., Salt Lake
City v. Grotepas. 906 P.2d 890, 891 (Utah 1995) (granting "certiorari for the narrow
purpose of reviewing the court of appeals' decision concerning1' ineffective assistance of
counsel test); Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Assfn v. Bagley & Co.. 901 P.2d 1017,
1018 (Utah 1995) (granting "certiorari for the narrow purpose of reviewing the court of
appeals' decision concerning" jurisdiction.). The State often challenges preservation on
direct appeal, even in cases where the defendant has created an extensive record of the
issue. If this Court considers the State's preservation claim in this case, even though
preservation is not an issue on certiorari review, then this Court will invite the State to
rehash its preservation claims in every case on certiorari. See Order dated November 10,
2004. This will unnecessarily clutter certiorari cases with preservation issues that were
already decided by the court of appeals and were not properly made part of the writ of
certiorari. See Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4). Thus, this Court should decline to review the
court of appeals' decision on preservation. Id. Instead, it should address the issue on
certiorari, "Whether testimony concerning an eyewitness' subjective certainty of
identification is inadmissible under rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence." Order
dated November 10, 2004.
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Regardless, this Court should reach the merits of the rule 403 issue because
Guzman preserved it for appeal. Preservation exists because "the trial court ought to be
given an opportunity to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it," and "a
defendant should not be permitted to forego making an objection with the strategy of
enhancing] the defendant's chances of acquittal and then, if that strategy fails,...
claiming] on appeal that the Court should reverse." State v. Holgate. 2000 UT 74,f 11,
10 P.3d 346 (quotations and citations omitted) (alterations in original). Thus, an issue is
preserved if ""'it is submitted to the trial court, and the court is afforded an opportunity
to rule on the issue."'" Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm'n, 945 P.2d 125, 129 (Utah Ct.
App.) (citations omitted), cert, denied, 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1997). Rule 403 says
evidence "may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice." Utah R. Evid. 403. Although Guzman never said the rule
number to the trial court, the major thrust of his argument was that the certainty evidence
should be excluded because it was not probative of the accuracy of Miller's identification
and was "particularly prejudicial because it reinforce[d] and exploited] juror
misconceptions about the eyewitness process." R. 72-74; 253:19-21. The trial court
rejected this argument and ruled the certainty evidence was admissible. R. 253:21-22.
Second, addressing the merits of the rule 403 issue, the State argues admission of
certainty evidence does not violate rule 403 because there is a "modest" correlation
between witness confidence and identification accuracy. Rspt. Br. at 32 (citing Brigham,
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Wasserman & Meissner, 36 Ct. Rev. at 18). A modest correlation, however, does not
change the fact that scientific research has "undermined the common notion that the
confidence with which an individual makes an identification is a valid indicator of the
accuracy of the recollection,f! and, lf[i]n fact, the accuracy of an identification is, at times,
inversely related to the confidence with which it is made." Long. 721 P.2d at 490
(citations omitted). In other words, in one case, a witness' confidence in her
identification will indicate accuracy, but in another case, this same confidence will
indicate inaccuracy, and there is no way for a jury to distinguish between these cases.
See id.; Leippe, 1 Psychol. Publ. Pol & L. at 925 (summarizing studies that found "jurors
are unable to discriminate between" accuracy and inaccuracy using certainty testimony).
Rather, juries will be forced to guess whether the certainty testimony at issue
indicates accuracy or inaccuracy and, when left to guess, juries tend to place "great
weight" on confident eyewitness identifications. Long. 721 P.2d at 490-91; Haber &
Haber, 6 Psychol. Pub. Pol. & L. at 1059; Leippe, 1 Psychol. Publ. Pol & L. at 928 ("At
present, the best evidence suggests that jurors have little inherent ability to 'read5
eyewitness accuracy. Instead, they read confidence and wrongly infer accuracy.");
Judges, 53 Ark. L. Rev. at 264 (citing Wells & Bradfield, 83 J. Applied Psychol, at 361);
Wells & Seelau, 1 Psychol. Pub. Pol. & L. at 773 (noting confidence "is the single most
powerful determinant of whether testimony observers believe that the eyewitness made
an accurate identification" (citations omitted)); Brigham, Wasserman & Meissner, 36 Ct.
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Rev. at 12. Thus, this Court should reverse because the probative value of certainty
testimony, if any, is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
CONCLUSION
Guzman requests this Court to reverse the court of appeals' decision in State v.
Guzman. 2004 UT App 211, 95 P.3d 302.
SUBMITTED this /** day of July, 2005.
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identifications, void of elaboration, exude confidence. They would convey no less certainty
than Claryn's statements that she was 100 percent confident in her identification.8
E.

DEFENDANT WAIVED ANY CLAIM THAT ADMISSION OF CONFIDENCE
TESTIMONY W A S UNDULY PREJUDICIAL UNDER RULE 403

Defendant also claims that the trial court erred in admitting Claryn's confidence
testimony because it was unduly prejudicial under rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. Aplt.
Brf. at 31 -32. Defendant did not argue rule 403 below, see R. 72-74,253: 11 -22, nor has he
argued plain error or exceptional circumstances on appeal, see Aplt. Brf. at 31-32.
Accordingly, this Court should not consider defendant's rule 403 claim. See State v. Hodges,
2002 UT 117, Tj 5, 63 P.3d 66.
II.

DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED ACCOMPLICE INSTRUCTION WAS
NEITHER WARRANTED NOR NECESSARY
In his second claim on appeal, Aplt. Brf. at 33-38, defendant contends that the trial

court erred in refusing to give his proposed accomplice instruction. See R. 78 (Addendum
B). That proposed instruction provided:
You are hereby instructed that the testimony of an informer who provides
evidence against a defendant must be examined and weighed by you with
greater care than the testimony of an ordinary witness. Whether the informer's
testimony has been affected by interest or prejudice against the defendant is

Moreover, exclusion of confidence testimony would also preclude defense counsel
from impeaching a witness based on his or her confidence level. For example, defense
counsel here could not have impeached Claryn's identifications by pointing out that she rated
her level of certainty in her identification of Fernando Fernandez at only 6 or 7 on a ten-point
scale. SeeR. 253: 144.
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